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The critical issues facing public administration manifest in droves in developing 
countries. I focus here on problems of administering the health sector in Africa, 
characterized by dire conditions and woeful results. I contrast two approaches to 
fostering administrative solutions in Africa’s health sector. The first is reflected in 
an older regime of development interventions in the 1990s focused on introducing 
a decentralization blueprint. The second is a newer regime centered on 
performance-based funding that incites more flexible, context-specific 
administrative solutions. I label the first approach a misguided example of experts 
proposing “THE ANSWER” and suggest the second accommodates dynamic 
solutions “appropriate to circumstance”. I show that the development community 
may be moving toward the second approach through a comparison of newer 
Global Fund projects that look different to older World Bank projects. I also show 
that the newer projects appear to be better implemented, with more tangible 
results.  I don’t suppose to say the evidence is conclusive but do think that it 
suggests African administrations need space to find themselves rather than 
prefabricated answers to who they should be. Administrative systems in places 
like the United States developed in just this kind of space. The same space should 
be afforded those now trying to develop. 









Development always has a major administrative component. Whether one is 
considering creating a new macro-forecasting unit in Haiti or fostering expansive 
regulatory reform in Guinea, administrative details have to be considered and 
solved: “How do we do what we want to do?” This question has typically been 
addressed within the context of sponsored projects and interventions in 
developing countries; often under the auspices of funding agencies like the World 
Bank and, more recently, new players including the Global Fund. The projects 
center on vital social issues. This paper focuses on one sub-set of such issues, in 
the health domain, and one region, Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
The administrative challenge posed by administrative issues in Africa’s health 
sector is both urgent and complex. Basic statistics show the continent way behind 
the rest of the world, and facing seemingly insurmountable problems—no skilled 
people, limited resources, and infrastructure constraints being the most basic. 
Recent critique of the development community’s response to these administrative 
issues in the 1990s suggests that organizations like the World Bank fostered one-
best-way administrative solutions characterized by strong policy-oriented central 
government units and decentralized service providers; with standardized 
processes, basic care packages and new buildings, cars and drugs thrown in as 
crucial inputs to producing health outcomes. If the critique is correct, such 
approach resembles a health sector version of “THE ANSWER” to development 
(much like the Washington Consensus for macroeconomics). It would contrast 
with a different approach to address administrative problems, allowing the 
emergence of administrative solutions “appropriate to circumstances” (Brown and 
Stillman, 1985, 466), which I believe seems to be reflected in new Global Fund 
interventions that provide performance-based flexibility for contingently-shaped 
administrative solutions. The Global Fund allocates money to the treatment and 
prevention of specific diseases, funding multi-actor initiatives in their efforts to 
reach particular performance targets, with minimal prescription on ‘how’ but with 
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institutionalized feedback to allow flexible adjustment and learning, given the 
circumstance.  
 
This paper looks at whether the development community has indeed gone from 
“THE ANSWER” to methods “appropriate to circumstances” in its approach to 
solving administrative problems in Africa’s health sector. It goes one step further 
to question whether the new approach is superior to its predecessor. In so doing it 
essentially asks if African health administrations need prefabricated answers to 
who they should be, or space to find themselves. The first section introduces the 
situation more clearly and poses some research hypotheses based on the following 
questions: Did the development community really have a one-best-way 
prescription to health administration in the 1990s? Is the new Global Fund 
approach really different, accommodating more flexibility and variation in 
administrative approach? Is there any evidence that the new approach is ‘better’ 
than the old? The second section discusses the qualitative method used to address 
these issues, essentially involving a disciplined analysis of project documents in a 
set of ten African countries. The final section presents evidence from this research 
and argues that there is no THE ANSWER to Africa’s health administration 
challenge but that solutions must be appropriate to circumstances.  
BACKGROUND AND CORE ARGUMENT 
 
Administrative processes are generally weak in Africa. They are even weak in 
projects conceptualized and funded by international agencies, which therefore 
have to address questions of what to do and how to do it. This paper concentrates 
on the ‘how to’ administrative challenges in the health domain. Projects in this 
area—and the ‘how’ administrative solutions they address—are set in context of 
the lowest life expectancy rate in the world (51 in 2001, compared with 78 in high 
income countries like the United States) and highest infant mortality and under 5 
mortality rates (92 and 151 per 1,000 births, compared with 6 and 6 in high 
income countries). Inequality in service provision is another fact of life, as is a 
debilitating lack of service providers (vacancy rates for nurses and doctors were 
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57% and 47% respectively in Ghana in 2000, and 40% and 55% in Zimbabwe in 
2004). Many of the countries are socially and politically unstable, and most have 
very weak economies. But the countries are also really different, with varying 
languages, traditions, government types, and geographic and social profiles. 
 
The importance of working in these domains cannot be overstated. The 
complexity of doing so also needs no mention. It is hard enough to think about 
‘what’ should be done, but arguably harder to think about ‘how’.  From my 
reading, I think many management and administrative legends (including people 
like Dwight Waldo) would have resisted giving formalistic solutions, preferring to 
“raise provocative questions [rather] than to offer “hard answers”” especially 
holding back from “providing THE ANSWER” (Brown and Stillman 1985, 459). 
In contrast, the development community is commonly criticized as focused on 
producing THE ANSWER and then replicating it as best or better or good 
practice. The notorious one-size-fits-all Washington Consensus stood as THE 
ANSWER to development economics for much of the late 1980s and 1990s, for 
example (Rodrik 2005). Now, governance indicators underlie one-best-way 
models of effective government (Andrews 2008).  
 
Commentators note that a similar ‘blueprint’ Health Sector Reform (HSR) 
approach dominated initiatives in the 1990s, manifest in numerous projects that 
looked very similar in “technical content and process” (Green 2004, 292). 
Observers suggest that this one-best-way blueprint fostered a standard 
administrative solution for health sectors based on a decentralization model 
characterized by: (i) Strong central entities making policy; (ii) Decentralized 
government service providers with clearly defined structures; (iii) Service 
provision dictated by centrally defined essential service packages; (iv) Inter-
organizational connections effected through strong central management control 
systems (including financial management and monitoring and evaluation); (v)  
With centrally administered resource management mechanisms (drug 
procurement, infrastructure and motor vehicle maintenance) (Green 2004).  
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Figure 1 illustrates the emphasis of this approach, on the structures of the 
government sector (the large, bolded oval), structures of individual government 
organizations within the sector (the individual bolded circles) and the structures 
connecting these (within the sector, from the center outwards, through rules about 
what can be provided, resource management systems and control mechanisms). 
One should note the rigid focus on the ‘structures’ as THE ANSWER, the lack of 
emphasis on mission and performance issues or of connection between the 
structural interventions and the mission, and the limitation of ‘sector’ perspective 
to ‘government’ (no NGOs, civil society, etc.). The essential idea is to 
institutionalize the structures—not necessarily the objectives. Put another way, 
process is tightly defined but goals are loose. 
  




Sector mission: Goals, with performance 
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While the idea of setting in place decentralization structures with a strong 
backbone of institutionalized management control may be attractive and seem 
universal, I believe many would have called their routine replication ‘faddy’. 
Dwight Waldo, for example, would have faulted the development community for 
viewing itself as many consider medicine, “Rather self-assured and stable” to 
believe this was THE ANSWER when in fact “A close look” at both the medical 
field and development administration community “reveals an apparently unending 
succession of changing opinions and therapies” (Brown and Stillman 1985, 465). 
He would not have advocated reproducing one administrative approach 
throughout Africa’s many health systems (even one based on seemingly sensible 
characteristics), but would rather have fostered approaches “appropriate to 
circumstances” (Brown and Stillman, 1985, 466). I believe he would have pointed 
to evidence of “circumstantial appropriateness” in health sectors of the world’s 
better performing nations. As I have argued previously (Andrews 2008), “Top 
scoring governments [on governance indicators] all produce highest-level health, 
education and infrastructure services ... [but] … There is less consistency in the 
way the different governments produce these services…  
Government in the USA plays a relatively smaller role in both 
sectors than in other countries, actually contributing less to health 
care than the private sector. Countries like Sweden and Denmark 
(and even the UK and Canada) stand in contrast, with relatively 
small private sector contributions. Structural approaches to 
delivery also vary greatly with some governments (like Sweden) 
engaged in more quasi-private activities than others ...  Public 
private partnership engagements in health, education, infrastructure 
and other sectors also vary across the sample as do levels of 
decentralization (with the UK, Belgium and the Netherlands more 
centralized in health care than Sweden, Denmark and Germany).” 
 
The management literature (especially on learning organizations but also on 
contingency) would probably have suggested a more flexible approach 
accommodating differences across Africa (just as these differences are 
accommodated by differences in structure in Sweden, the USA and Canada). Such 
approach, especially influenced by the performance movement, might center on 
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the issues to be addressed, the people to be reached, and the people involved in 
providing the administrative solution. The complexity of different situations, 
manifest in the different profiles of issues and people, would ‘contingently 
influence the administrative solution’ in different places.  
 
One could imagine this different approach pointing administrators in the right 
direction (based on mission and reach), affording them flexibility in getting there, 
and allowing frequent feedback to assess progress and allow learning and 
adjustment. Figure 2 is a modified version of Figure 1, to show how I think this 
alternative approach might look. It focuses tightly on goals, but is loose on 
process. 
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Figure 2 emphasizes defining and pursuing the mission (shown in bold), through a 
broad set of actors (government and non, with the sector border no longer rigidly 
defined). The actors in this sector would be encouraged to determine their own 
contextually appropriate structures (for the sector, for organizations within the 
sector, and also for inter-organizational connections—all non-bolded or not even 
shown, denoting that they are not prescribed or only loosely identified). Feedback 
loops would be purposefully structured into the system, with some shown in bold 
connecting organizations to and through each other to information pertaining to 
sectoral performance. The information loops would go both ways, allowing 
organizations to learn about the implications of mission for their own structures 
(facilitating adjustments) and to learn about complications with the mission (also 
facilitating adjustments). The adjustments would essentially, over time, ensure a 
dynamic administrative solution to dynamic problems, ‘appropriate to 
circumstances’. The essential idea is to institutionalize an active focus on 
objectives, and allow flexibility in structural administrative response. 
 
In many senses this is the approach the Global Fund (GF) claims to take. It 
involves providing money against performance commitments in specific disease 
areas (clear mission and clear reach) to projects initiated through multi-actor 
Country Coordination Mechanisms (CCMs) (acknowledging the multiplicity of 
policy and administrative actors), to be implemented by multiple agents in 
coordination with each other, and with regular reviews that accommodate 
flexibility and the continual shaping of administrative solutions to circumstances. 
This approach is itself the product of most recent better practice thinking in public 
and even private management theory. Consider commentary on the Fund’s 
descriptions of its approach (in parentheses, from the Global Fund website, 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/funds_raised/principles): 
•  “The Fund will base its work on programs that reflect national ownership 
and respect country-led formulation and implementation processes” 
reflects directly on ideas that solutions come from inside organizations (a 
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key tenet of theory on learning organizations, and recent literature on 
organizational change). 
•  “The Fund will support proposals which focus on performance by linking 
resources to the achievement of clear, measurable and sustainable results” 
draws directly from the past two decades’ emphasis on introducing 
performance into the public domain. 
•  “The Fund will support proposals which focus on the creation, 
development and expansion of government/private/NGO partnerships” 
links to the public administration emphasis on networks, distributed and 
collaborative governance structures and inter-organizational complexity. 
•   “The Fund will support proposals which strengthen the participation of 
communities and people, particularly those infected and directly affected 
by the three diseases, in the development of proposals” ties to the growing 
public administration literature on civic engagement and direct 
democracy. 
•  “Once awards are made, Local Fund Agents assess local capacity to 
implement programs. Specific and measurable intended results are 
incorporated into grant agreements, and ongoing grant disbursements are 
tied to progress, as reported and independently verified at regular 
intervals.” This resonates again with the language of performance 
management and particularly with recent work on performance-based 
accountability and performance-based dialog, and the opportunities such 
creates for single and double loop learning (especially when the Local 
Fund Agents Assessments are used to facilitate program improvement). 
 
The interesting thing about the Global Fund’s approach to using these kinds of 
better practice ideas is that it blends them together in a fairly postmodern way, to 
create space for solution rather than as the solution (as critics claim the 1990s 
projects did—in more of a modernist tradition).  I liken this to my reading of 
recent work by development economists Dani Rodrik and Ricardo Hausmann—
on the totally unrelated topic of industrial policy. They decry the one end of 
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growth literature that argues for hard technical industrial policy intervention by 
governments in ‘picking winners’—industries on which to focus, for instance. 
They also criticize those calling for no government involvement at all. Their work 
suggests an alternative solution focused on government’s policy and 
administrative role in fostering growth-enhancing decisions by business. In 
discussing his ideas for effective “institutional arrangements for industrial policy” 
Rodrik (2004, 16) emphasizes creating administrative structures that stimulate 
coordination, information sharing and learning, primarily between firms in 
industries but also at the interface between firms and government. He and 
Hausmann (2006, 31) call this proposed framework an “open architecture” in 
which government’s role is less about making a technical choice about how 
growth should be achieved and more about allowing “potential areas of attention 
[to] evolve” by “creating [a] space” for such. 
 
I have developed a similar focus on ‘space’ creation as the key to development in 
my research on public sector reform. In observing government attempts to solve 
management problems with standard technical mechanisms I find that the same 
mechanisms have vastly different results in different settings. I also observe that 
the technical solution can become the problem itself. In trying to explain these 
different experiences I find that those cases where reform progresses furthest 
seem to have an organizing logic facilitating change, creativity, open thought and 
new ideas much like Rodrik and Hausmann’s open architecture would. On the 
basis of these observations I developed a simple model in which 'reform’ or 
‘change’ space is the crucial ingredient for public sector adjustment and 
implementation. This space does not seem random to me, but rather a real 
organizational quality that emerges where three factors align—administrative 
acceptance of a particular mission and its implications, administrative authority to 
tackle the mission, and administrative ability to tackle the mission (Andrews 
2004). This kind of space is highly circumstance-specific and will probably come 
in different shapes and sizes, is not about formulas but rather about mission driven 
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and inspired problem-solving management—adaptive rather than technical in 
nature. 
 
Proponents of the new Global Fund approach seem to argue that it is a significant 
improvement on the project approach of the past, ostensibly because it fosters this 
kind of locally owned, performance driven, dynamic administrative form—or 
‘space’ for administrative solution. Green (2004, 292) hails it as a departure from 
Health Sector Reforms (HSR) of old and an example of interventions “focused on 
health system performance and development (HSD).” McCarthy (2007, 307) 
quotes William Easterly’s praise for its mission focus, comparing this to prior 
experience: “One of the curses of foreign aid is that each agency tries to do 
everything; and when you try to do everything, you tend to do a mediocre or bad 
job.” McCarthy (2007, 307) also cites Joanne Carter, “associate director of 
RESULTS, an advocacy group” who “says that the Global Fund has 
“fundamentally transformed” the fight against tuberculosis. “It is like night and 
day”, she said. “We knew what to do; we had systems in place; now with Global 
Fund support we can actually do what we know we can do.””  
 
Carter lends strong support to the idea that the Global Fund approach solves the 
administrative question of ‘how’ to do the things ‘what’ development experts 
knew were needed. Her comment seems to answer conclusively ‘yes’, ‘yes’ and 
‘yes’ to the following three questions I still have in reviewing the story to date: 
•  Did the development community really have a one-best-way blueprint 
prescription to health administration in the 1990s?  
•  Is the new Global Fund approach really different, accommodating more 
flexibility and variation in administrative approach?  
•  Is there any evidence that the new approach is ‘better’ than the old? 
Carter’s answers allow the formulation of research hypotheses related to the 
questions: 
H1: The development community had a one-best-way, rigid model of health 
administration in the 1990s, reflected in strong similarities in 
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administrative elements of health sector interventions across countries 
(focused on creating strong singular central entities and planning protocols 
and decentralized service delivery entities, and providing inputs for the 
sector, with very little focus on mission and performance and/or on 
flexible organizational learning). 
H2: The Global Fund method offers a new, flexible approach to health 
administration “appropriate to circumstances” reflected in relatively high 
levels of variation in administrative elements of cross-country health 
sector interventions (the approaches, while varying, are expected to 
accommodate organizational opportunities—space—for learning and 
innovation, for multiple organizations, driven by mission and performance 
concerns). 
H3: The Global Fund method has been more successful than the old approach, 
evidenced in higher levels of policy and program implementation and 
greater impact of interventions. 
 
RESEARCH METHOD AND DATA SOURCES 
  
The kind of information required to investigate these hypotheses is not readily 
available in a database. It is, however, buried in many records on projects and 
interventions in African countries. This is largely because transparency in the 
development community has improved remarkably in the past two decades. I 
began my search of these records by accessing publicly available documents 
related to over 50 World Bank and World Health Organization (WHO) 
interventions in Africa during the 1980s and 1990s. These were the basis of 
background reading on the topic and the initial hypothesis—emerging from casual 
reading, not rigorous study—that projects from the era appeared similar in content 
(technical and administrative). 
 
The quality and content of the documents varied significantly, however, posing 
reliability and validity problems for more rigorous research.  I thus decided to 
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concentrate such research on projects where similar content was available, in the 
form of project descriptions (at conception) and project assessments (at 
completion) in one of the two organizations. I chose the World Bank because of 
the greater availability of publicly available information, and settled on a set of 
ten projects (in different countries) with the requisite ‘thick’ documentation. They 
were all in sub-Saharan Africa and all introduced during the 1990s, albeit at 
different times (see Table 1). Given that I am assuming these all came from the 
same ‘era’ the fact that they were introduced over a fairly long ten year period 
constitutes a problem for comparison. Are projects developed in 1998 really from 
the same era as those developed in 1992? The issue is not trivial but is easily 
resolved by controlling for dates of project conception in discussing the sample’s 
characteristics. 
 
I identified these characteristics (to assess whether a one-best-way model was in 
place in the era) by initially collecting and coding all information on project 
components—recording exactly what administrative issues individual projects 
addressed. Information was coded and recorded using a rigid-flexible approach 
whereby I first matched text with characteristics of the ‘blueprint’ characteristics 
implied by Green (2004) as central to THE ANSWER: Building strong central 
entities making policy; Creating decentralized government service providers with 
clearly defined structures; Fostering service provision dictated by centrally 
defined essential service packages; Creating inter-organizational connections 
effected through strong centrally managed management control systems 
(including financial management and monitoring and evaluation), and; Promoting 
centrally administered resource management mechanisms (drug procurement, 
infrastructure and motor vehicle maintenance). After matching with these rigid 
categories (where I expected to find most of the attention in all countries) I 
recorded project characteristics that looked different under headings that emerged 
through the analysis. 
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Table 1. Countries and project analyzed
2 
Country  World Bank project, duration  Global Fund project, duration 
Comoros  Health Project, 1998-2004  Prevention of Sexually Transmitted 
Infections and HIV/AIDS Among Youths 
and Adolescents, 2005-2007 
Cote d’Ivoire  Integrated Health Services 
Development, 1996-2004 
Prevention of the spread of the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic in the context of severe political 
and military crisis, 2004-2006 
Eritrea  Health Project, 1998-2004  National AIDS Control Program, 2004-
2006 
Ethiopia Health  Sector  Development 
Program, 1999-2006 
HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control, 2003-
2004 
Ghana Health  Sector  Support, 1998-2004  Accelerating access to prevention, care, 
support and treatment of all persons 
affected by HIV/AIDS, 2002-2003 
Guinea  Health and Nutrition Sector Project, 
1994-2002.  
Project to Strengthen the Fight Against 
HIV/AIDS, 2004-2008.  
Niger Health  Sector  development 
Program, 1997-2003 
Contribution to the Fight Against Sexually 
Transmitted Diseases and HIV/AIDS, 
2004-2006 
Sierra Leone  Health Sector Investment Project, 
1996-2003 
Development of a comprehensive national 
response to HIV/AIDS that includes 
adequate prevention, treatment, care and 
support for those affected, 2005-2007 
Uganda  District Health Project, 1995-2002.   Comprehensive Country Proposal for 
Scaling up the National Response to 
HIV/AIDS, 2003-2005 
Zambia  Health Sector Support Project, 
1995-2000.  
Churches Health Association of Zambia's 
Program to Combat HIV/AIDS, 2003-2005 
 
The resulting spreadsheet allowed me to note exactly how many of the ten 
projects adopted the THE ANSWER reform elements and how alike the projects 
actually were. I was able to compare this information with a similar spreadsheet 
of characteristics of Global Fund HIV/AIDS projects in the same ten countries, all 
initiated after 2002 (See Table 1). As will be seen, the Global Fund project 
information did not allow a very rigid coding approach—given the high levels of 
variation they exhibited. A more flexible method was thus adopted, to analyze the 
publicly available documents I accessed on project proposal and grant 
performance (written to decide second tranche awards on existing projects).
3 As 
with the World Bank documents, these all had similar structures that allowed for 
                                                 
2 In the case of World Bank projects, documents accessed were typically the Project Appraisal 
Document (or equivalent) and Implementation Completion Report (or equivalent). Global Fund 
documents accessed were the Original Proposal and Grant Score card. 
3 Or similar performance reports for projects not yet at this stage. 
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easy comparison. The structures are different to the World Bank documents but 
essentially capture similar information—especially as is required for the current 
study.  
 
One could question the comparison of the two samples because the Global Fund 
projects are focused on HIV/AIDS only while the World Bank projects cover a 
wide variety of issues. I do not think this is a problem given how the documentary 
derived data is used: To check whether World Bank project characteristics are 
more rigidly defined and therefore more similar across countries than Global 
Fund project characteristics. If this is indeed reflected in the evidence, even with 
more variation in World Bank projects, support for the hypothesis would only be 
stronger. 
 
The two data sources—World Bank and Global Fund documents—were then used 
as the basis for analyzing the final hypothesis, that new-era Global Fund 
interventions are more effective than old-era World Bank projects. I based this 
assessment on information in the World Bank Implementation Completion 
Reports (ICR) and Global Fund Grant Score Cards. These documents record a 
mixture of written descriptions and numeric or symbol-based ‘performance’ 
metrics.  Metrics used differ between the two organizations. Given observations 
about these differences, I focus my discussion as much on the nature of the 
performance dialog in the two sets of documents (and what it says about how 
performance was framed) as I do on the actual evidence of performance.  
 
EVIDENCE AND DISCUSSION 
 
I believe the research method is well suited to study the hypotheses at hand, 
accommodating both descriptive reflections on the qualitative evidence reviewed 
(through references to actual words used) as well as a more quantitative 
presentation of patterns in this evidence (through references to frequencies of 
words used or of topic discussion). The research method was systematically 
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developed to allow analysis of the three hypotheses presented earlier. This is how 
I discuss the evidence as well.  
 
Did 1990s projects follow a ‘THE ANSWER’ administrative blueprint? 
 
Did the ten World Bank projects look similar, reflecting an administrative 
blueprint focused on developing structures specific to a one-best-way 
decentralization model? If so, then one would find the following characteristics 
dominating all projects: (i) Strong central entities making policy; (ii) 
Decentralized government service providers with clearly defined structures; (iii) 
Service provision dictated by centrally defined essential service packages; (iv) 
Inter-organizational connections effected through strong centrally managed 
management control systems; (v) Centrally administered resource management 
mechanisms. One would also find other characteristics, “appropriate to 
circumstances” introduced only at the margins of projects, limited emphasis on 
non-governmental actor involvement, and little attention to objectives and 
mission. 
 
I will start by noting that documents certainly pay limited attention to objectives 
and mission, apart from the most recent—Ghana’s 1998-2002 Health Sector 
Project and Ethiopia’s 1999-2006 Health Sector Development Project (and Sierra 
Leone’s project after a 2000 adjustment). Ghana’s completion report includes a 
prominent page 3 table showing output and outcome data for seven performance 
areas, with 2001 estimates standing shoulder-to-shoulder with 1996 baselines. 
The similar Ethiopian document opens with a six page section on development 
objectives and indicators, as well as a list of dated “Ratings of Project 
Performance”. The Ethiopian project is the only one which seems to have 
introduced performance metrics with baseline measures at project initiation. 
These metrics also serve as the primary basis of communicating project 
effectiveness and appear to have driven regular learning loops (via regular 
Implementation Status Reports, tied to disbursements).  
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In contrast, other projects note “objectives” in vague written descriptions with 
limited evidence of measures, baselines and attempts at institutionalized 
evaluation. Sierra Leone’s Health Sector Investment Project (1996-2003) notes 
one objective as “improve key health status indicators” and its Implementation 
Completion Report provides some metrics associated with such in an annex—but 
the baseline is 2000. This timing anomaly is partly due to the project’s stops-and-
starts (given unrest in the country) but also arises because the metrics were not 
evident at the project’s start (apparently added as it progressed, or maybe even at 
conclusion). This is the pattern across the eight other projects, where the emphasis 
on mission/objectives/performance is quite low:  
•  The Comoros Implementation Completion Report has little reference to 
objectives and results in its main text. It does, however, have a table in 
Annex 1 that shows aggregated performance against indicators identified 
at appraisal. These are not discussed in any detail and questions of 
attribution are significant.  
•  Cote d’Ivoire has a similar Annex 1 table, with extremely little discussion 
of objectives in the main text. Its annex does not suggest that indicators 
were identified at appraisal, however, and there is no evidence of 
indicators and baselines identified in appraisal documents.  
•  Eritrea’s Implementation Completion Report provides a table of key 
performance indicators only in Annex 1, but this table is not in initial 
project preparation documents.  
•  Guinea’s Completion document provides (again in an annex) a list of 
indicators and “actual/latest estimates”, where it compares mid-term and 
end of project statistics. Similar data is missing from the project 
preparation documents reviewed.  
•  Niger’s completion document has metrics like those in Sierra Leone (also 
in an annex), which candidly indicate that baselines were “not defined in 
PAD (Project Appraisal Document)”.  
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•  Uganda’s Implementation Completion Report shows (in annexes) various 
tables of data on health care utilization etc. but with no direct reference to 
project objectives.  
•  Zambia’s completion document opens with a small paragraph that 
suggests problems with attributing project impact on outcomes, and then 
only shows key indicators in Annex 1. Much like Guinea, indicators and 
baselines seem to have been introduced along the way as they were not in 
place at project initiation. 
 
All of the project documents apart from those pertaining to Ethiopia and Ghana 
lead with sections describing “components” rather than objectives. These 
components tend to emphasize structural interventions, not performance (as 
hypothesized) and also emphasize government role players above others (again as 
hypothesized). Central government entities are the borrower/implementing agency 
in all ten cases (a biased finding because these are the only entities allowed to 
borrow from the World Bank). Furthermore, non-government engagement is 
rather low in most cases. Six of the ten sets of project documents did suggest 
some intended engagement with civil society and NGOs, but mostly at the margin 
of a minor component. The Comoros project, for example, indicated that the 
Ministry of Health created a small project fund for sub-project financing (and 
notes nothing more, other than that there was some corruption in the process). The 
Sierra Leonean project indicates fostering some communication between the 
Ministry of Health and NGOs. The Zambian reports speak of community 
institutions created and then abolished, ostensibly important to the 
decentralization initiative but not discussed very much. Once again, the most 
recent Ethiopian project stands apart, incorporating elements aimed at increasing 
private sector participation in health care (especially through the provision of 
technical advisory services), training staff in health NGOs, creating accreditation 
mechanisms for NGOs and private sector health professionals, and establishing 
broad communication programs for social awareness. 
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The Ethiopian project thus has some characteristics that run counter to the 
hypothesis that all 1990s projects lacked mission focus and were predominantly 
focused on establishing certain structures in government organizations only. The 
other nine project documents generally support the hypothesis, however, with (as 
argued) limited mission focus and limited discussion of non-governmental 
players. All ten projects are similar in their focus on decentralization, however, 
and on the kinds of structural interventions critics suggest constituted the 
blueprint administrative decentralization model of the 1990s. This focus (which I 
will discuss momentarily) drowns out any project elements that appear different 
or “appropriate to circumstances”. These are evident in all ten projects but at the 
margins, accounting for less than 25 percent of project funding in all cases.  
Eritrea developed a blood bank that has proved vital in addressing the HIV crisis, 
for example, accounting for about $2 million of a $21.1 million project. Guinea’s 
sub-component 3 (of 6) emphasized “strengthening key technical programs” and 
included some specific interventions like an iodine deficiency intervention to 
address the circumstantial manifestation of goiters in one region. Sierra Leone’s 
project included a component aimed at addressing major health issues which also 
emphasizes some technical and administrative solutions for the country’s peculiar 
post conflict setting. However, even this component ended up being revised and 
overlapping with objectives to “reform the health system” through a series of 
‘usual suspect’ structural interventions. 
 
These ‘usual suspect interventions’ center on establishing the kinds of 
characteristics noted at the start of this section and implicit in the earlier 
hypothesis: a specific model of decentralization. They account for at least two 
thirds of all project focus in all ten cases, wrapped in an emphasis on 
decentralization explicit in all documents:  
•  The Comoros project sought to strengthen decentralization, noting that 
“Support for decentralization was already firmly established.” 
•  Ideas in the Cote d’Ivoire project were “pressed in favor of … 
decentralization.” 
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•  The main component in Eritrea’s project sought “to enhance 
decentralization” 
•  Ethiopia’s project had as a major objective, “Strengthening the Borrower’s 
health sector management and information systems with a view to 
establishing a well-managed, decentralized, and participatory health 
system” 
•  The Ghanaian project sought explicitly to enhance “decentralization of 
decision-making to regional and district management teams…” 
•  Guinea’s project explicitly mentions the goal of “Rehabilitation and 
strengthening of decentralization process” 
•  Niger’s project aimed to “ensure continued improvement of the 
population’s health through” … [primarily] … “decentralization of basic 
health services.”  
•  The Sierra Leone project mentions its goal of “decentralization of 
management and decision-making.” 
•  The Zambian project notes that, “decentralization was the earliest reform 
to be initiated.” 
 
The Ugandan project describes its decentralization intentions in a way that 
explicitly shows parts of the ‘blueprint’ approach evident across the projects: 
The project aimed to “Support the MoH at the center in realigning its role 
to be compatible with the decentralization policy and to strengthen the 
Ministry in order to provide the necessary leadership/stewardship of the 
sector in the new policy environment … The project was to support the 
MoH in formulating and executing action plans for health services 
decentralization.” 
As with the others, the Ugandan project had multiple components: Pilot 
Activities, Demonstration Activities, Capacity Building for District Health 
Administration and Restructuring and Capacity Building for the Ministry of 
Health. I examined each component separately to assess the degree of focus on 
the ‘blueprint’ characteristics named earlier. As with all the projects, I found these 
characteristics implicit in all components: 
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•  The Pilot Activities centered on a number of districts implementing an 
Essential Health Services Package. 
•  Demonstration Activities emphasized implementing the Essential Health 
Services Package in another seven. 
•  Capacity Building for District Health Administrations aimed to provide 
equipment, infrastructure, and such to district offices. There is some 
discussion of working with NGOs but the emphasis is on enhancing the 
autonomy and effectiveness of government health units. 
•  Restructuring and Capacity Building for the Ministry of Health aims to 
assist the MoH in realigning its role to be compatible with the new 
decentralized structure. It included helping the MoH play a greater policy 
planning role, exercise oversight, develop management and control 
mechanisms and strengthen procurement and logistics management. 
As discussed in the section on research method, I conducted a similar study of all 
ten projects, and constructed Table 2 to summarize evidence of ‘blueprint’ 
characteristics. Uganda’s column reflects characteristics drawn even from the 
basic descriptions above. The underlying evidence is of course much more 
detailed, for Uganda and all the other countries’ projects. The bottom line is that 
the ten projects focused predominantly on packages of these characteristics, with 
some (like Uganda’s project) addressing all at once and others (like Comoros and 
Eritrea) incorporating three or four. 
 
Table 2.Which ‘blueprint’ administration characteristics appear in which projects? 
Characteristic Cote 
d’Ivoire 































































































































Table 2 and the related discussion certainly do not prove that health projects 
across Africa in the 1990s all looked the same. The evidence does, however, lend 
support to the hypothesis that the administrative approach fostered in these 
projects reflected a common blueprint. I am not trying to evaluate whether the 
blueprint was good or bad, just to assess whether evidence supports the idea 
critics have had for years, that a one-best-way, rigid model of health 
administration existed. And I think the evidence does show this, with major 
similarities in administrative approach across this admittedly small but also 
diverse sample of projects and countries. They generally focused little on mission, 
much on government organizations, and predominantly on introducing common 
structural change. This change model, one could argue, was an example of  the 
development community having “THE ANSWER” to Africa’s health sector 
administration problems—much like the Washington Consensus solved all the 
world’s macroeconomic problems. 
 
Are newer projects more flexible, ‘Appropriate to Circumstances?’  
 
 
Some say that the only thing that stays the same is change. Others argue that the 
more things change the more they stay the same. Put the two together and we 
have the question driving a second part of this analysis: Is the new, changed, 
Global Fund approach really different, accommodating more flexibility and 
variation in administrative approach to health administration in Africa? Of course 
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I imply a positive answer in my earlier hypothesis, convinced by Joanne Carter’s 
words that the Global Fund has “fundamentally transformed” health 
administrative solutions, allowing her and her fellow health care professionals to 
finally “do what we know we can do.”  But does the evidence support the 
hypothesis?  Does it show that the Global Fund fosters an approach focused on 
mission and results rather than structure, accommodating multiple actors, 
allowing multiple administrative solutions, and encouraging dynamic learning and 
shaping of administrative solutions “appropriate to circumstance”? 
 
I believe the answer is a repetitive yes, yes, and yes. 
 
My first observation from the ten grant proposal and score card combinations was 
the emphasis on performance. Whereas the World Bank project documents (apart 
from Kenya and to a lesser extent Ghana) had very little information on mission, 
objectives, and results, Global Fund projects are largely about exactly these 
things. If sixty or seventy percent of the World Bank documents focus on 
structure and process, the Global Fund documents spend the same proportion of 
pages on the topic of mission, objective and results. Within two pages of the start 
of each proposal one finds a box or loose text about overall goals, activities and 
main activities in each component. The Grant Scorecards similarly begin the 
leading “Rationale for Recommendation” section with a discussion on program 
performance, generally in the form of concise bullet pointed metrics. The two 
documents routinely allocate most of their pages to discussion of mission, results 
metrics, baseline indicators and activities needed to meet targets. The objectives 
tend to be extremely operational as a result of this attention, and are obviously 
and explicitly the basis of project evaluation. 
 
My second observation was the variation in objectives across the ten projects. 
One should remember that they are all focused on HIV/AIDS and should thus be 
more similar in substance than the World Bank projects, which were of a wide 
variety covering the entire health sector. But consider examples of the differences: 
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•  Cote d’Ivoire’s intervention has a stated goal (or mission statement) of 
“Reduc[ing] the spread and the effects of HIV/AIDS in the rebel-
controlled zones as well as in the refugee-hosting areas adjacent to the 
front lines (buffer zone) over a period of 18 months.” The objectives it 
identifies to achieve this include: Reorganizing the condom-distribution 
network and ensuring regular distribution of condoms; Initiating or 
strengthening general and local awareness campaigns tailored to the 
situation and involving community peer educators; Strengthening the 
intervention capabilities of the local NGOs or associations in the field; 
and coordinating or strengthening the HIV/AIDS interventions of 
international and non-governmental agencies active in the field in the 
rebel-controlled zones, including the healthcare centres under their 
authority.  
•  The Eritrean project has as the ultimate goal (akin to a mission statement), 
“To reduce sexual, blood and mother-to-child- HIV transmission, and 
mitigate the personal, social and economic impact of HIV/AIDS”. Its 
objectives include: Scaling-up and expanding effective HIV prevention 
activities with target populations; Increasing the number of people who 
know their HIV status by improving availability and quality of voluntary 
counselling and testing (VCT); Increasing the number of infected mothers 
who receive effective counselling and medical intervention to decrease 
the likelihood of HIV transmission (PMTCT); Improving the availability 
and the quality of health care and psychosocial and economic support for 
people with HIV/AIDS (PLHAs) and those affected by the epidemic; 
Expanding blood transfusion safety (HIV, Hepatitis B and C and Syphilis) 
to regional blood banks, and establishing procedures to ensure adherence 
to Universal Precautions in the health care setting; Strengthening and 
expanding epidemiological and behavioural surveillance for evidence-
based planning. 
•  Niger’s project’s end goal (mission) statement is: “To reduce the 
developing tendencies of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and reduce its negative 
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effects throughout the population.” The objectives include: Intensifying 
STI/HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment efforts in at least 90% of the 
population of Niger by 2006, placing specific emphasis on young people 
between 10 and 24 year's old, groups at risk and vulnerable groups; 
Ensuring correct STI/HIV/AIDS treatment and access to ARVs for 3500 
PLH, including psychosocial and physical support. 
Just in these three examples we find different goals focused on tackling the spread 
of AIDS in remote conflict areas, reducing the transmission of AIDS from mother 
to child, and addressing HIV/AIDS in young people and groups at risk, with Anti-
Retroviral treatment. The objectives differ even more, from improving condom 
distribution networks and mobilizing local and international NGOs in rebel areas 
to scaling up testing and counseling of mothers and ensuring safe blood 
transfusion capacities, to providing anti-retroviral drugs.  
 
My third observation is embedded in the descriptions of objectives: Global Fund 
projects accommodate multiple actors, in number and type. The different actor 
combinations appear to arise as “appropriate to circumstance” (as do the goals and 
objectives). The project in Cote d’Ivoire, for example, stressed the role of local 
NGOs and community groups in addressing HIV issues in rebel controlled areas, 
partly because government entities were not functional in such areas. The 
Principal Recipient managing this project was also a non-governmental agency, 
the local office of CARE international. The project intended to draw in support 
from international NGOs, local NGOs, local “clubs”, and a network of local peer 
educators. This assortment differs substantially from the government-centered 
perspective on who is included in the health sector evident in 1990s World Bank 
projects. (Actually, the Cote d’Ivoire case turns the relational blueprint on its 
head, with the NGO Principal Recipient managing the Central Ministry of Health 
as a Sub-Recipient). 
 
The actor mix in the Cote d’Ivoire project also differs from that in other projects, 
however. Two of the remaining nine projects were also managed by non-
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governmental Principal Recipients (The Association Comorienne pour le Bien-
Etre de la Famille (ASCOBEF) in Comoros and The Churches Health 
Association in Zambia), three were managed by specially created coordination 
bodies in government (Ethiopia’s HIV/AIDS Directorate, Niger’s Multiscetoral 
Unit for the Fight Against HIV/AIDS and Sierra Leone’s National HIV/AIDS  
Secretariat) and four were managed by single, central government entities 
(Eritrea’s Ministry of Health, Ghana’s Ministry of Health, Guinea’s Ministry of 
Public Health, and Uganda’s Ministry of Finance). One could contrast even this 
with the fact that singular central government ministries were main partners for all 
1990s projects reviewed. 
 
Beyond the managing entity one also finds a broader set of actors—in different 
mixes—across the projects. Uganda’s 2003-2005 project notes that, “The partners 
who will be involved in the implementation of the CCP will include Government 
sectors, civil society organizations (CSO’s), private sector, and groups of PHA 
[people living with HIV/AIDS].” The actual implementation approach adopted 
involved the Central Ministry of Finance leading and coordinating the broader 
engagement, which was dominated by government entities in most respects. This 
is similar to Ghana’s experience, where the Global Fund proposal noted the aim 
of catalyzing governmental attempts to deal with HIV/AIDS. District 
governments were the main sub-recipients in this case, and private/public 
partnerships were forged for specific reasons (mostly to mobilize extra human 
resources and facilitate service delivery). In Guinea, however, the Global Fund 
project was managed by a central government entity but implemented by a broad 
variety of players—local prefectures, the national reference library, district 
facilities and a wide range of NGOs who received contracts to provide key 
services. The Guinea project is similar to that in Cote d’Ivoire in that it also 
included performance metrics related to the number of community centers and 
NGOs created, engaged and/or strengthened—reflecting an obvious awareness of 
the multi-actor nature of the health sector. The two experiences are also similarly 
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characterized by conflict, which undermines the ability of government to access 
many areas and makes NGO engagement “appropriate to circumstance.” 
 
Eritrea has also been plagued by conflict and thus also found non-governmental 
entities circumstantially better-positioned to intervene than government. It also 
found these entities lacking capacity for action, however, so introduced a time-
sensitive approach that had government leading initially but also building other 
entities to lead in future: 
“At the moment, the greatest capacity for implementation outside of the 
Government is in the FBOs. However, the implementation capacity of 
the FBOs is limited due to the nature of the personnel available, the 
nature of the institutions and primarily the lack of financial resources. 
The religious organisations in Eritrea do not provide any significant 
amount of preventive or curative services unlike the situation in many 
African countries. Our implementation strategy, therefore, focuses on 
Government implementation of activities and interventions in the first 
years of the project. We have attempted to increase the allocation of 
funding to our potential partners in order to build their capacity and to 
enable them to become more operational in the future.” 
   
I also observed broad, contextually driven, varying actor engagements in the 
membership and structure of Country Coordination Mechanisms (CCM). The 
Global Fund requires that all proposals flow through this entity, created in most 
cases especially for such purpose. It is one of what I see as three administrative 
pre-requisites for Global Fund engagement (the others being the need for a 
Principal Recipient (PR) to manage the program and for Local Fund Agents to 
facilitate on-going monitoring of project performance). As I have already 
suggested with the variation in PR identity, the CCMs look very different. The 
variation is not just about membership, however, but also about administrative 
structure and operation: 
•  Guinea’s CCM has over 50 members from a broad spectrum and is 
chaired by the local representative of the World Health Organization. 
The General Meeting convenes twice a year to make major decisions, 
but an executive committee and technical working groups meet more 
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often to provide oversight to projects. It has elaborate coordination and 
communication mechanisms in place to facilitate its own engagement. 
•  Eritrea’s CCM emerged from a Steering Committee created to oversee 
implementation of a 1990s World Bank project (called HAMSET). It 
has only eleven members and is Chaired by a Government Minister. It 
meets bi-annually to facilitate reporting to the Global Fund but also 
meets on an ad-hoc basis, as a full CCM. It met multiple times in a 
three week period running run-up to project approval in August and 
September 2002, for example, but then only again the next May. The 
organization seems more inter-personal than formal and there is no 
evidence of the need or function of any elaborate coordinating 
mechanism. 
 
These are just two examples. The variation in membership size should give an 
indication of how much difference there is across all ten countries: The Comoros 
CCM has 27 members, Cote d’Ivoire’s CCM has 25 members, Ethiopia’s CCM 
has 14 members, Ghana’s CCM has 39 members, Niger’s CCM has 19 members, 
Sierra Leone’s CCM has 25 members, Uganda’s CCM has over 50 members, and 
Zambia’s CCM has 22 members. The variation in administrative structure and 
implementation approach extends beyond the CCM as well. I have already 
mentioned differences in the organizational identities of PRs, as well as the 
different assortments of collaborators engaged in projects.  The differences show 
the lack of an administrative blueprint in Global Fund engagements. Even where 
the interventions explicitly mention links to decentralization initiatives (as in 
Ghana) their contents cannot be neatly and consistently coded into categories like 
those in Table 2. Ghana’s intervention, for example, did include steps to 
strengthen HIV/AIDS prevention capacities in district-level facilities, but these 
facilities were “public, private and mission” facilities—not just public. Facility 
strengthening was also one of twenty activities focused on reaching objectives, 
which implied different administrative relationships, control structures and such 
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(including mechanisms to coordinate community groups and NGOs, to disburse 
money directly to people living with HIV/AIDS, etc.). 
 
One can see differences in administrative ‘solutions’ in the way project proposals 
describe core processes (The Global Fund requires that all proposals specify their 
solutions to management issues like CCM/PR relationships, Monitoring and 
Evaluation, Financial Management and Procurement/Supply Chain Management). 
Monitoring and Evaluation in Ghana was done through pre-existing government 
mechanisms. Project finances in Ghana flowed through the national treasury and 
the Ministry of Health, treated as earmarked funds. Financial management 
procedures were thus defined by the national standards and mechanisms (much 
like they would have been done in 1990s World Bank projects). In contrast, the 
Zambia CCM took up a special role in monitoring, committing to establish 
partnerships to access information needed at appropriate times. The CCM 
indicated, for example, that it would introduce a new special annual report on 
activities of NGO sub-recipients. The Zambian CCM allowed sub-recipients to 
use their own financial management systems and even reporting mechanisms, but 
did preserve the right to require some standardization of reports, as needed. Cote 
d’Ivoire and the Comoros had another totally different administrative approach to 
financial management, defined most prominently by the fact that money flowed 
through the NGOs and not government. The relevant NGOs (CARE in Cote 
d’Ivoire) signed agreements with local NGOs and then worked with these NGOs 
to (in CARE’s case) “design a programme of activities and an operational 
budget.” It thus took the responsibility of creating financial management systems 
in recipients appropriate to the recipient and the Global Fund intervention. This 
differs significantly from the 1990s model of creating standardized Management 
Control Systems in central Ministries of Health to accommodate management of 
decentralized government units.  
 
The different administrative structures also manifest in different administrative 
problems, identified through the Global Fund’s regular monitoring mechanisms 
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(mostly by Local Fund Agents at times of disbursement). And interestingly, there 
is also variation in administrative solutions! In Ethiopia’s case the PR is lauded as 
doing a good job, but weak monitoring and evaluation systems are identified as a 
problem, partly related to sub-par engagement of the CCM. The ‘solution’ 
involves strengthening the CCM’s oversight activities and engaging the World 
Bank and PEPFAR project teams in supporting technical assistance for better 
monitoring. The non-governmental Zambian PR is commended for its good 
management as well: “CHAZ [Churches Health Association of Zambia] is marked 
by strong leadership, close coordination with their network of mission hospitals 
and rural health centers, and the spirit of a learning organization that accepts and 
embraces constructive feedback on performance.” Monitoring and evaluation 
concerns are also raised in regard to the Zambian project, however, but they are 
quite different to those in Ethiopia: While CHAZ had a solid system it lacked the 
capacity to effectively cover all sub-recipients and ensure quality control of data. 
The solution was also different, involving the Local Fund Agent conducting ad 
hoc quality checks on data and seeking to reinforce CHAZ’s monitoring and 
evaluation capacity by hiring an extra person. 
 
The Zambian project also suffered some procurement problems, stemming from 
CHAZ’s dependence on government procurement systems (through a tender 
board). The solution, identified through the ongoing dialog about performance 
and problems, was to start procuring products through an independent 
procurement agent. Procurement weaknesses in Guinea were one part of a general 
management failure, implicating the PR, CCM and strategic partners (notably 
UNICEF, the procurement agent). The problems were so significant that the 
UNDP was asked to finance technical assistance to create and run a central 
management unit, which worked closely with a WHO technical team to save the 
grant. The Comoros faced a similar management breakdown that was tackled by 
strengthening the capacity of the original PR, not introducing another unit. Much 
of its struggle is in coordinating and managing NGOs (with multiple reporting 
practices), and part of the solution involved standardizing the NGO processes. 
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Cote d’Ivoire’s project was also heavy on NGO engagement (in rebel-controlled 
areas) but coordination and control of these entities did not pose a major problem. 
The complication peculiar to this circumstance centered on tensions between the 
Principal Recipient NGO (CARE) and the Sub Recipient Ministry of Health (and 
some other agencies).
4 The solution was better coordination between the two, 
something contextually relevant. 
 
I am not suggesting that these were all ‘solutions’ in a final sense (of achieving 
improved administration). I am just pointing them out as further evidence of the 
lack of a blueprint in the newer Global Fund type health sector interventions in 
Africa. I believe this evidence supports the hypothesis that these interventions are 
in fact different in their approach to dealing with the administrative question of 
‘how’ in Africa’s health sector. They are focused on mission and results rather 
than structure, do not rigidly define sectoral boundaries and allow for broad and 
different collaborative engagements. They accommodate many different 
administrative structures—and indeed evolving ones (based on learning). They 
thus do not provide “THE ANSWER” but allow approaches that are “Appropriate 
to Circumstances.” 
 
Is the new approach better than the old one? 
 
 
This is not an evaluation of old versus new. It is rather a comparison of a set of 
projects in one era and another set in a new era. Thus far I have tested two 
hypotheses that combine to say, “The newer projects look very different to the 
old.” I have presented evidence that I believe lends considerable support to these 
hypotheses and the conclusion that the shift from old to new projects presents a 
move away from prescribing “THE ANSWER” to administrative problems in 
African health care to allowing organic emergence of answers “appropriate to 
circumstances.” 
                                                 
4 The Grant Performance Report notes that, “ There has been some resistance from other 
agencies to be coordinated by CARE..” 
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The third hypothesis introduced earlier proposed that the newer projects would be 
better than the old—yielding greater levels of implementation and impact. This 
section reviews the evidence to assess if such hypothesis is also supported by the 
current study. The review is complicated by the fact that the two types of 
documents referenced for information for old and new project types provide quite 
different perspectives on ‘performance.’ Table 3 shows the metrics they use, for 
example, with the ‘old’ World Bank projects assessing project outcomes on an 
ordinal basis with three options (Unsatisfactory, Satisfactory and Highly 
Satisfactory) as well as scoring the likelihood of sustainability and institutional 
development impact (like administrative strengthening). The Global Fund 
performance reports and Grant Scorecards use an ordinal scale as well, with four 
options, to indicate if the project’s overall performance is excellent, adequate, 
inadequate or unacceptable (A, B1, B2 and C).  
 
 Table 3. How the projects were ‘rated’ in respective documents 
  ‘Old’ World Bank projects  New Global 
Fund Projects 




Comoros  Unsatisfactory (1 of 3)  Unlikely (1 of 3)  Modest (2 of 3)  A (1 of 4)
5
 
Cote d’Ivoire  Unsatisfactory (1 of 3)  Unlikely (1 of 3)  Negligible (1 of 3)  A (1 of 4) 
Eritrea  Unsatisfactory (1 of 3)  Likely (2 of 3)  Substantial (3 of 3)  B1 (2 of 4) 
Ethiopia
6
  Moderately 
Satisfactory (2 of 3) 
    B1 (2 of 4) 
Ghana  Satisfactory (2 of 3)  Likely (2 of 3)  Substantial (3 of 3)  A (1 of 4) 
Guinea  Satisfactory (2 of 3)  Likely (2 of 3)  Substantial (3 of 3)  B1 (2 of 4) 
Niger  Unsatisfactory (1 of 3)  Unlikely (1 of 3)  Modest (2 of 3)  B2 (3 of 4) 
Sierra Leone  Satisfactory (2 of 3)  Unlikely (1 of 3)  Substantial (3 of 3)  A (1 of 4) 
Uganda  Unsatisfactory (1 of 3)  Likely (2 of 3)  Substantial (3 of 3)  B1 (2 of 4) 
Zambia  Unsatisfactory (1 of 3)  Likely (2 of 3)  Modest (2 of 3)  A (1 of 4) 
 
One useful observation drawn from the table is that there is variation in results in 
both old and new projects! Another is that the worst performer on the new 
projects (Niger, the only one to get a B2 in the sample) was also a poor performer 
in the old project regime (producing unsatisfactory outcomes, unlikely 
sustainability and only modest institutional development impact). Two of the 
                                                 
5 This score was taken from the Global Fund’s summary of projects, not the Scorecard, which 
suggests a B1 outcome instead. 
6 World Bank assessment approach changed for this, the most recent project. 
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three countries with ‘satisfactory’ 1990s projects also scored A’s on the new 
Global Fund projects (Ghana and Sierra Leone). Three of the countries in which 
1990s projects were marked ‘unsatisfactory’ managed to get highest rated ‘A’ 
Global Fund project results, however (Comoros, Cote d’Ivoire and Zambia).  
 
One should note that the older World Bank projects in these three countries were 
adjudged as achieving only ‘modest’, ‘negligible’ and ‘modest’ improvements in 
institutional (essentially administrative) development.  This undermines any 
thoughts readers might have of suggesting that strong Global Fund project 
performance now was facilitated by the older projects in the past (at least in these 
projects). Experience in the Comoros suggests a lack of acceptance of the 
blueprint decentralization approach, especially with the strong role of the central 
Ministry of Health (and the national planning mechanism at its disposal):  
“The project had a moderate impact on the institutional development of 
the sector. Support for decentralization was already firmly established… 
[but] … Health sector support and the project’s own initial objectives for 
implementing a national poverty reduction strategy were far less broadly 
accepted … Conflicts between the central and island authorities 
contributed to the underutilization of documents offering options for 
strengthening the sector…” 
The World Bank project in Cote d’Ivoire was judged as having “positive but 
negligible” institutional impact, largely because of a lack of incentives to actually 
implement the new administrative ‘tools’:  
“The project has developed a series of structures, tools and procedures 
… [but] … a major effort is likely needed to establish incentives that 
encourage effective utilization of the tools.”  
Zambia’s Implementation Completion Report suggests limited success in 
strengthening the health sector, which it explains at various points in terms of low 
capacity in local entities and varying levels of buy-in across actors and over time. 
It concludes that, at project conclusion,  
“Financial management, procurement planning and logistics 
management, monitoring and evaluation, and human resource capacity 
are still considered to fall short of what is required for an effectively 
functioning decentralized system.”   
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One should note further that the institutional approach taken in the three more 
successful Global Fund projects was significantly different to the 1990s World 
Bank projects. The biggest difference was management by non-governmental 
organizations. Did the fact that the new project type allows different 
administrative leadership accommodate better results? The Global Fund would 
probably argue so, and cite its finding that projects managed by civil society 
organizations perform better on average than those managed by government 
organizations.
7 It could also point to the fact that NGO leadership—while not 
easy—was contextually appropriate in Cote d’Ivoire given the lack of government 
reach into rebel-controlled areas: “CARE is doing a good job trying to bring 
together agencies working in the northern part of the country which is under the 
control of the ‘New Forces’ and thus somewhat out of touch with HIV efforts of 
the government in Abidjan.” It could also cite the potential its Zambian project 
tapped in the faith-based community, which allowed a contextually appropriate 
and accepted form of health sector decentralization different to the blueprint type 
the 1990s project failed to institute:  
“[The] Program … enables the expansion of a comprehensive response 
to HIV/AIDS, ranging from prevention to mitigation to treatment 
activities. It concentrates on mobilizing the faith-based community and 
strengthening delivery of services at health facilities run by religious 
institutions.”  
 
This kind of argument can only get one so far, however, in trying to suggest that 
newer projects have better implementation and impact than old ones. More 
focused evidence is required, allowing active comparison between results in the 
two types of projects in the same country setting. Arguably, this evidence is 
available, through qualitative descriptions and quantitative data. Consider what 
documents say about Cote d’Ivoire’s older and newer projects (as well as what 
some of the numbers show): 
The older project  The newer project 
                                                 
7 Referencing the Global Fund’s report on Civil Society Organizations (undated, at 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/ru/partners/ngo/introduction/): “Year-end figures from 2006 show 
that 83 percent of civil society PRs were A or B1-rated. Civil society as an entity received the 
largest percentage of A and B1-ratings (28 percent A-rated and 55 percent B1-rated) in 
comparison to the other entities involved in grant implementation.” 
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The 1996-2004 project is rated “unsatisfactory” 
and “no data can be made available to support 
any significant improvement for the period … 
with regard to overall performance of the health 
system … with the exception of the General 
Census.” 
The 2006-2008 project is given an “A”, as 
“Most of the intended results have been 
achieved or largely exceeded” 
 
Key results (related to Project Development 
Objectives (PSOs)) include: 
Key results include: 
•  The main ‘achievement’ noted is the 
completion of a General Census of the 
population (including publication). 
•  Percentage of deliveries correctly assisted 
has increased from 44 to 63. 
•  Number of curative consultations per 
annum per 100 inhabitants has dropped 
form 24 to 21. 
•  One functional unit has been created for 
the MoH to support districts. 
•  95 Health facilities were equipped to 
provide family planning services 
(compared with the goal of 106). 
•  4 programs were resuscitated in the context 
of addressing ‘post conflict needs’ (short of 
the targeted 8). 
•  Five other PDOs were not addressed at all. 
•  By period 6, 169 wholesalers and sub-
wholesalers have a regular supply of 
condoms available (compared with baseline 
of 10 and target of 70 by this period) 
•  85 local NGOs/Community Associations 
and International Organizations regularly 
distributing condoms (minimum of 500 per 
month) (compared with baseline of 2 and 
target of 30 by this period) 
•  5,645,019 condoms sold (compared with 
target of 4,600,000). 
•  20 departments in the target areas with HIV 
prevention activities (compared with 
baseline of 1 and target of 20 by this period) 
•  119 Military camps have HIV prevention 
activities (compared with baseline of 0 and 
target of 20 by this period) 
•  85 Local NGOs strengthened and supported 
(compared with baseline of 0 and target of 
20 by this period) 
•  33 additional Anti-AIDS clubs developed 
(compared with baseline of 0 and target of 
30 by this period) 
•  And five other similar references. 
 
The side-by-side comparison should show that the newer project performance 
information is more tangible and ‘sharper’ than the older one. It is also arguably 
easier to attribute results to the intervention. The newer project is obviously more 
effectively implemented than the older one, but it is difficult to assess impact of 
either (the first project has no information on this and the latter is too new for the 
data—measures of such are slated for two and three years out in the project 
monitoring and evaluation plan). One can do this kind of comparison on all ten 
projects. In most cases one will find a clearer focus on performance and tighter 
attribution of project activities to performance in the new projects and hence the 
appearance of better implementation and potential impact. This is even the case 
when one compares Ghana’s Satisfactory World Bank project with its “A” Global 
Fund Project.  
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The completion report from Ghana’s 1998-2000 project provides a table of 
outputs and outcomes according to which the project was judged. The outputs 
include “outpatient visits per capita”, “births attended by skilled health staff”, 
“TB cure rate”, “proportion of children using bed nets” and others. Four out of 
seven fell short of achieving projected rates (one—the proportion of children 
using bed nets, actually showed lower end numbers than the 1996 baseline). The 
outcomes include “percentage of government recurrent budget spent on health”, 
“infant mortality rate”, “life expectancy years” and “percent under-fives 
underweight”. Six of seven achieved outcomes were below projected goals. The 
completion report also asks whether the project should be credited with such 
outcomes: “The question remains as to whether or not these gains were influenced 
by [the project].” Even with this evidence and qualification, the project was 
considered effective, based largely on the qualitative statement that “the overall 
sector program is on track and the implementation is successful [yielding] the 
specific details of activities … less important.”  
 
Compare this with the opening paragraph in Ghana’s Global Fund project 
scorecard:  
“The program’s overall performance is good, and it has exceeded 
targets for key indicators. In particular, 6,698 people completed the 
voluntary testing and counseling process (135% of target), an 
additional 4,399 pregnant women completed the testing and 
counseling process as part of the prevention of mother-to-child 
transmission pilot program (146% of target), 884 HIV-infected women 
received a complete course of antiretroviral prophylaxis to reduce the 
risk of mother-to-child transmission (98% of target), and 6,404 people 
received prophylaxis and treatment for opportunistic infections (101% 
of target).” 
I cannot vouch for these or any other numbers in the documents analyzed. I can 
say, however, that what they communicate is a clear level of project 
implementation, with direct outputs one could well see connected to significant 
outcomes and impacts. My tendency to believe the numbers is supported by the 
up-front discussion of project shortcomings as well:  
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“The grant was less successful reaching people in its prophylaxis and 
treatment for people with opportunistic infections, antiretroviral 
therapy (ARV) and monitoring, and care and support service delivery 
areas. This poorer performance was primarily due to program 
management issues, particularly in procurement.” 
Inherent in this statement is the idea that performance information is not just 
provided to show good versus bad performance but, perhaps more importantly, to 
facilitate dialog and action to improve performance in the future. This kind of 
comment is present in all ten Global Fund projects and is a major reason why I do 
believe the projects end up with higher levels of implementation and potential 
impact than their predecessors (even if they start slowly, as was the case in six of 
the ten analyzed). 
 
Interestingly, this performance-based learning characteristic is evident in the 
discussion of both the Ethiopian and Sierra Leonean World Bank projects. As 
discussed, the Ethiopian project also shares the general performance emphasis 
with Global Fund projects, and is in many ways a peer (produced in late 1999 and 
running to 2006). The Sierra Leonean project, though initially conceived in 1996 
and closed in 2003, was also in many ways alike the Global Fund type projects. 
This was because the project was largely derailed until 2000 by civil war and 
unrest. It was then re-defined in 2000 when it incorporated performance metrics 
and largely adjusted its focus to “address priority health needs … taking 
appropriate … measures.” The ability to re-draw the project is attributed to “built-
in flexibility in the project design” which, like Global Fund projects, allowed 
adjustments on the basis of regular performance assessments (in this case annual 
planning processes).  The Implementation Completion Report credits the flexible 
adjustment and emerging performance approach with a positive result in which “a 
number of accomplishments materialized.” It is important to note that results were 
stronger and more tangible in the objective area that emphasized major public 
health issues (like maternal and child health and HIV/AIDS) than in the more 
dominant “Reform the Health system” objective area (which continued to 
promote a blueprint decentralization model): while a central store and 12 district 
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offices were created, the $3 million rehabilitation of district hospitals was 
completely shelved because it not was no longer a priority, “appropriate to the 
circumstances.” 
 
I would argue that the Sierra Leonean project exhibits within itself the transition 
from older approaches to providing an administrative blueprint to the newer 
approach of accommodating flexibility in administrative solution. I would argue 
further that qualitative evidence exists suggesting the superiority of the ‘newer’ 
approach in Sierra Leone. I have also tried to present such evidence in comparing 
most of the older World Bank projects with newer Global Fund projects. I believe 
this evidence too suggests superiority of the new approach, supporting the 





African health outcomes are way behind the rest of the world. The continent has 
no time to waste in rectifying the problem. But this will require generating 
solutions to major administrative weaknesses in the continent’s health sector. I 
look at two approaches to this challenge, implied in projects in the development 
community in the 1990s and more recently via the Global Fund. The former 
projects present a routine solution or THE ANSWER in the form of a specific 
blueprint for organizing government. The second set of projects allows much 
more flexibility of administrative solution, centered on allowing sectors to work 
out how they will meet tightly defined objectives. This approach accommodates 
solutions that are “appropriate to circumstances” which emphasize creating 
‘space’ in which management solutions can be appropriately fashioned rather than 
forcing square peg models into round peg countries. 
 
The approach implies thinking by many giants of management. I see hints of Tom 
Peters’ loose-tight model here (with tightly defined objectives and regular 
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monitoring, but loose accommodation of innovative solutions and ideas). I also 
see Hirschmann’s Hiding Hand principle—of not over-planning and over-
specifying solutions but rather allowing creativity. I also think Lindblom’s 
“Muddling Through” ideas are relevant—emphasizing the importance of 
managers (especially in political settings) working through problems in a dynamic 
and creative fashion. While development approaches often recommend one-size-
fits-all models of management (and more recently governance) these giants 
emphasize experimentation, differential fit and learning by doing. 
 
I think that these thinkers would have approved of this approach, and the Global 
Fund model, even though it has its weaknesses (reflected in critiques of vertical 
funds, the lack of direct technical assistance, sustainability, etc.). I sense they 
would approve that the new approach acknowledges (i) the importance of 
administration being about service (and mission), (ii) the messiness of 
administrative tasks and settings, (iii) the multiplicity of actors potentially 
involved, and (iv) the importance of administrative creativity. The approval could 
reflect this paper’s evidence that the new approaches are different to the old 
approaches, and seem to yield higher levels of implementation and impact. It 
could also be more focused, relating that the new approach seems to work even in 
conflict environments like Cote d’Ivoire, where other interventions failed 
miserably; or that strong results were recorded in countries like Sierra Leone 
regardless of near-to-no human resource capacity in the health sector.  
 
The most positive aspect of the new approach, in my own opinion, is that these 
sectors were, possibly for the first time, starting to define themselves and set a 
path for their future development. There is growing evidence that administrative 
systems develop over time, along dynamic paths, and not in moments where 
blueprint best practices are imported for use.  Administrative solutions should 
emerge as appropriate to circumstance, reflecting a path determined by context. 
Much like teenagers need structured space to find themselves rather than 
prefabricated answers to who they should be. I believe the new Global Fund 
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approach to fostering mission driven solutions to Africa’s health care 
administration problems can create such structured space, and is much preferred 
to the old approaches based on THE ANSWER. Future research would be well-
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